Known unknowns unconventional "strategic shocks" in defense strategy development
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Freier, N. (2008). Known unknowns: unconventional "strategic shocks" in defense strategy development . Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute and Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College.
Chicago / Turabian - Author Date Citation, 17th Edition (style guide)Freier, Nathan. 2008. Known Unknowns: Unconventional "strategic Shocks" in Defense Strategy Development. Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute and Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College.
Chicago / Turabian - Humanities (Notes and Bibliography) Citation, 17th Edition (style guide)Freier, Nathan. Known Unknowns: Unconventional "strategic Shocks" in Defense Strategy Development Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute and Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2008.
MLA Citation, 9th Edition (style guide)Freier, Nathan. Known Unknowns: Unconventional "strategic Shocks" in Defense Strategy Development Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute and Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2008.
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Grouped Work ID | ae282abd-0f49-c9a9-0507-2fd436a2d0c5-eng |
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Full title | known unknowns unconventional strategic shocks in defense strategy development |
Author | freier nathan |
Grouping Category | book |
Last Update | 2022-07-13 05:41:45AM |
Last Indexed | 2024-07-07 00:37:07AM |
Book Cover Information
Image Source | default |
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First Loaded | Jun 16, 2023 |
Last Used | Nov 14, 2023 |
Marc Record
First Detected | Apr 25, 2010 12:00:00 AM |
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Last File Modification Time | Aug 18, 2021 03:28:09 AM |
MARC Record
LEADER | 05031nam a2200457 a 4500 | ||
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001 | ocn609303404 | ||
003 | OCoLC | ||
005 | 20110201143514.0 | ||
006 | m d f | ||
007 | cr un||||||||| | ||
008 | 100425s2008 pau ob f000 0 eng c | ||
019 | |a 270101154 | ||
020 | |z 158487368X | ||
020 | |z 9781584873686 | ||
040 | |a OCLCE|b eng|c OCLCE|d DID|d GPO|d GAO|d OCLCQ|d GPO|d MvI | ||
042 | |a pcc | ||
043 | |a n-us--- | ||
049 | |a TNN | ||
074 | |a 0307-A-66 (online) | ||
086 | 0 | |a D 101.146/17-2:ST 8 | |
099 | |a D 101.146/17-2:ST 8 | ||
100 | 1 | |a Freier, Nathan. | |
245 | 1 | 0 | |a Known unknowns|h [electronic resource] :|b unconventional "strategic shocks" in defense strategy development /|c Nathan Freier. |
246 | 3 | 0 | |a Unconventional "strategic shocks" in defense strategy development. |
260 | |a Carlisle, Pa. :|b Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute and Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College,|c [2008] | ||
300 | |a 1 online resource (viii, 44 p.) | ||
440 | 0 | |a PKSOI papers. | |
500 | |a Title from title screen (viewed on Feb. 1, 2011) | ||
500 | |a "November 2008." | ||
500 | |a "The current defense team confronted a game-changing "strategic shock" in its first 8 months in office. The next team would be well-advised to expect the same. Defense-relevant strategic shocks jolt convention to such an extent that they force sudden, unanticipated change in the Department of Defense's (DoD) perceptions about threat, vulnerability, and strategic response. Their unanticipated onset forces the entire defense enterprise to reorient and restructure institutions, employ capabilities in unexpected ways, and confront challenges that are fundamentally different than those routinely considered in defense calculations. The likeliest and most dangerous future shocks will be unconventional. They will not emerge from thunderbolt advances in an opponent's military capabilities. Rather, they will manifest themselves in ways far outside established defense convention. Most will be nonmilitary in origin and character, and not, by definition, defense-specific events conducive to the conventional employment of the DoD enterprise. They will rise from an analytical no man's land separating well-considered, stock and trade defense contingencies and pure defense speculation. Their origin is most likely to be in irregular, catastrophic, and hybrid threats of "purpose" (emerging from hostile design) or threats of "context" (emerging in the absence of hostile purpose or design). Of the two, the latter is both the least understood and the most dangerous."--P. vii. | ||
504 | |a Includes bibliographical references (p. 37-44) | ||
505 | 0 | |a Summary -- Introduction : the failure of imagination -- "Known unknowns" : predictable but unpredicted strategic shocks -- Trapped by convention : seeing the future we want? -- Seeing the whole future : incorporating shocks in defense strategy -- Routinizing imagination : plausible unconventional shocks -- Conclusion : Avoiding the next blue ribbon panel -- or worse. | |
520 | |a The current defense team confronted a game-changing "strategic shock" in its first 8 months in office. The next team would be well-advised to expect the same. Defense-relevant strategic shocks jolt convention to such an extent that they force sudden, unanticipated change in the Department of Defense's (DoD) perceptions about threat, vulnerability, and strategic response. Their unanticipated onset forces the entire defense enterprise to reorient and restructure institutions, employ capabilities in unexpected ways, and confront challenges that are fundamentally different than those routinely considered in defense calculations. The likeliest and most dangerous future shocks will be unconventional. They will not emerge from thunderbolt advances in an opponent's military capabilities. Rather, they will manifest themselves in ways far outside established defense convention. Most will be nonmilitary in origin and character, and not, by definition, defense-specific events conducive to the conventional employment of the DoD enterprise. They will rise from an analytical no man's land separating well-considered, stock and trade defense contingencies and pure defense speculation. Their origin is most likely to be in irregular, catastrophic, and hybrid threats of "purpose" (emerging from hostile design) or threats of "context" (emerging in the absence of hostile purpose or design). Of the two, the latter is both the least understood and the most dangerous. | ||
610 | 1 | 0 | |a United States.|b Dept. of Defense|v Rules and practice. |
650 | 0 | |a Surprise (Military science) | |
650 | 0 | |a Military art and science. | |
650 | 0 | |a Strategy. | |
710 | 2 | |a Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute. | |
710 | 2 | |a Army War College (U.S.).|b Strategic Studies Institute. | |
776 | 0 | 8 | |i Print version:|a Freier, Nathan.|t Known unknowns|h viii, 44p.|w (DLC) 2009366047|w (OCoLC)287119646. |
856 | 4 | 0 | |u http://purl.fdlp.gov/GPO/gpo3624|z Online Version |